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In this paper we revisit the debate over the role of the banking panics in 1930-33 in precipitating the
Great Contraction. The issue hinges over whether the panics were illiquidity shocks and hence in
support of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) greatly exacerbated the recession which had begun in 1929,
or whether they largely reflected insolvency in response to the recession caused by other forces. Based
on a VAR and new data on the sources of bank failures in the 1930s from Richardson (2007), we find
that illiquidity shocks played a key role in explaining the bank failures during the Friedman and Schwartz
banking panic windows.
In the recent crisis the Federal Reserve learned the Friedman and Schwartz lesson from the banking
panics of the 1930s of conducting expansionary open market policy to meet demands for liquidity.
Unlike the 1930s the deepest problem of the recent crisis was not illiquidity but insolvency and especially
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1. Introduction: The Friedman and Schwartz Hypothesis and the Subsequent 
Debate 
 
The Great Depression was by far the greatest economic event of the twentieth century 
and comparisons to it were rife during the recent Great Recession. Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) labeled the downturn in the United States from August 1929 to March 
1933 the Great Contraction. Since that event a voluminous literature has debated its 
causes in the United States and its transmission around the world. This paper focuses 
strictly on U.S. domestic issues. 
 
At the time, the consensus view was that the slump was a consequence of the speculative 
boom of the 1920s. The boom was regarded as a manifestation of deep seated structural 
imbalances seen in overinvestment. Indeed according to the Austrian view which 
prevailed in the interwar period, depressions were part of the normal operation of the 
business cycle. Policy prescriptions from this view included tight money, tight fiscal 
policy and wage cuts to restore balance. 
 
Keynes (1936) of course rejected these prescriptions and the Classical view that 
eventually a return to full employment would be achieved by falling wages and prices. 
He attributed the slump to a collapse of aggregate demand, especially private investment.  
His policy prescription was to use fiscal policy—both pump priming and massive 
government expenditures.  In the post World War II era, Keynesian views dominated the 
economics profession and the explanations given for the depression emphasized different 
components of expenditure.   4
 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in A Monetary History of the United States   (1963)  
challenged this view and attributed the Great Contraction from 1929 to 1933 to a collapse 
of the money supply by one third brought about by a failure of Federal Reserve policy. 
The story they tell begins with the Fed tightening policy in early 1928 to stem the Wall 
Street boom. Fed officials believing in the real bills doctrine were concerned that the 
asset price boom would lead to inflation. The subsequent downturn beginning in August 
1929 was soon followed by the stock market crash in October. Friedman and Schwartz, 
unlike Galbraith (1955), did not view the Crash as the cause of the subsequent depression. 
They saw it as an exacerbating factor (whereby adverse expectations led the public to 
attempt to increase their liquidity) in the decline in activity in the first year of the 
Contraction. 
 
The real problem arose with a series of four banking panics beginning in October 1930 
and ending with Roosevelt’s national banking holiday in March 1933. According to 
Friedman and Schwartz, the banking panics worked through the money multiplier to 
reduce the money stock (via a decrease in the public’s deposit to currency ratio). The 
panic in turn reflected what Friedman and Schwartz called a ‘ contagion of fear” as the 
public fearful of being last in line to convert their deposits into currency, staged runs on 
the banking system, leading to massive bank failures. In today’s terms it would be a 
“liquidity shock”. The collapse in money supply in turn led to a decline in spending and, 
in the face of nominal rigidities, especially of sticky money wages, a decline in 
employment and output. The process was aggravated by banks dumping their earning   5
assets in a fire sale and by debt deflation. Both forces reduced the value of banks 
collateral and weakened their balance sheets, in turn leading to weakening and insolvency 
of banks with initially sound assets. 
 
According to Friedman and Schwartz, had the Fed acted as a proper lender of last resort 
as it was established to be in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 that it would have offset 
the effects of the banking panics on the money stock and prevented the Great Contraction. 
 
Friedman and Schwartz’s “money hypothesis “was attacked by Peter Temin in Did 
Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? (1976). Temin challenged Friedman and 
Schwartz’s assumption that the money supply collapse was an exogenous event. He 
argued that money supply fell in response to the downturn. He attributed the collapse in 
income to a decline in autonomous consumption expenditure and in exports. The fall in 
income in turn reduced the demand for money and money supply responded. At the heart 
of his critique is the view that the banking collapses beginning in October of 1930 were 
not “contagious liquidity shocks” but endogenous “insolvency” responses to a previous 
decline in economic activity especially in agricultural regions hit by declining commodity 
prices beginning in the 1920s.  This was reflected in a weakening of bank balance sheets. 
 
The Temin challenge prompted an enormous literature in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
upshot of the debate was “that though monetary forces are viewed as the key causes of 
the Great Depression, non monetary forces emerge as having considerable importance” 
Bordo ( 1986 page 358).   6
 
The issue was revisited in the 1980s in a seminal article by Bernanke (1983) who like 
Friedman and Schwartz, attributed the Great Contraction to monetary forces and 
especially the collapse of the banking system. However he placed less emphasis on the 
effects via the quantity theory of money on spending and more on the consequences of 
the collapse of the banking system in raising the cost of financial intermediation. 
 
The issue of the banking panics was revisited in the 1990s in a book by Elmus Wicker  
The Banking Panics of the Great Depression  (1996) who carefully re examined the 
evidence using disaggregated  data from local newspapers and Federal Reserve 
documents not available to Friedman and Schwartz. He concluded that two of the 
Friedman and Schwartz banking panics, the fall of 1930 and the spring of 1931 were 
regional and not national events as Friedman and Schwartz had claimed. The other two 
panics, fall 1931 and winter 1933, he concurred were national events.  Also, in contrast to 
Temin, he supported the Friedman and Schwartz view that all the panics (both regional 
and national) were largely liquidity shocks, evidenced in a rise in currency hoarding. He 
also argued that expansionary Fed open market policy could have offset the panics and 
prevented the transition in 1930-31 from a serious recession to the Great Contraction. 
 
In the past two decades a number of scholars have reopened the issue of the importance 
of the banking panics for the U.S. Great Depression and especially whether they reflected 
illiquidity or insolvency. Following Temin, Wicker and White (1984), this literature has 
focused on disaggregated individual bank data categorized by types of banks and by data   7
sources, in contrast to the macro approach taken by Friedman and Schwartz and 
Bernanke.  Section 2 discusses some of this literature. Section 3 briefly examines why the 
U. S. had so many bank failures and was so prone to banking panics in its history. Section 
4 provides some econometric evidence on the issue of illiquidity versus insolvency and 
also discusses some of the methodological issues in using macro time series versus using 
disaggregated data. Section 5 compares the financial crises of the 1930s in the U.S. to the 
recent financial crisis 2007-2008. Section 6 concludes with some lessons for policy. 
2. The Recent Debate over U.S. Banking Panics in the 1930s: Illiquidity 
versus Insolvency. 
 
In this section we survey recent literature on whether the clusters of bank failures that 
occurred between 1930 and 1933 were really panics in the sense of illiquidity shocks.
1 
This has important implications for the causes of the Great Depression. If the clusters of 
bank failures were really panics then it would support the original Friedman and 
Schwartz explanation. If the clusters of bank failures primarily reflected insolvency then 
other factors such as a decline in autonomous expenditures or negative productivity 
shocks (Prescott1999) must explain the Great Contraction. 
 
Friedman and Schwartz viewed the banking panics as largely the consequence of 
illiquidity, especially in 1930-31. Their key evidence was a decline in the deposit 
currency ratio which lowered the money multiplier, money supply and nominal spending. 
They describe the panic in the fall of 1930 as leading to “a contagion of fear’ especially 
                                                 
1 Panics can arise because of exogenous illiquidity shocks in the context of the Diamond and Dybvig 
( 1983) random withdrawals model or in the context of asymmetric information induced runs and panics 
( Calomiris and Gorton, 1991)   8
after the failure of the Bank of United States in New York City in December. They also 
discussed the effects of the initial banking panic leading to contagion by banks dumping 
their earning assets in a “fire sale” in order to build up their reserves. This in turn led to 
the failure of otherwise solvent banks. Wicker (1996) disputes whether the 1930 panic 
and the spring 1931 Friedman and Schwartz panics were national in scope but agrees 
with them that all four banking panics were liquidity shocks. 
 
By contrast both Temin(1976) and White (1984), the latter using disaggregated data on a 
sample of national banks, argued that the original 1930 banking panic was not a liquidity 
event but a solvency event occurring in banks in agricultural regions in the south and the 
Midwest which had been weakened by the recession. These small unit banks came out of 
the 1920s in a fragile state reflecting declining agricultural prices and oversupply after 
World War I. As in Wicker (1980) they identify the locus of the crisis as the collapse on 
November 7 1930 of the Caldwell investment bank holding company of Nashville, 
Tennessee on November 7, 1930, a chain bank (in which one holding company had a 
controlling interest in a chain of banks), and its correspondent network across a half 
dozen states. 
 
Calomiris and Mason (2003), following the approach taken in Calomiris and Mason 
(1997) to analyze a local banking panic in Chicago in June 1932, use disaggregated data 
on all of the individual member banks of the Federal Reserve System to directly address 
the question whether the clusters of banking failures of 1930-33 reflected illiquidity or 
insolvency. Based on a survival duration model on 8700 individual banks they relate the   9
timing of bank failures to various characteristics of the banks as well as to local, regional 
and national shocks. They find that  a list of fundamentals including; bank size, the 
presence of branch banking, net worth relative to assets as a measure of leverage; reliance 
on demand debt; market power; the value of the portfolio; loan quality; the share of 
agriculture; as well as several macro variables, largely explains the timing of the bank 
failures. When they add into the regression as regressors the Friedman and Schwartz 
panic windows (or Wicker’s amendments to them) they turn out to be of minimal 
significance. Thus they conclude that ,with the exception of the 1933 banking panic, 
which as Wicker (1996) argued reflected a cumulative series of state bank suspensions in 
January and February leading to the national banking holiday on March 6, that illiquidity 
was inconsequential. 
 
Richardson (2007) provides a new comprehensive data source on the reasons for bank 
suspensions from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors including all 
Fed member banks and nonmember banks (both state and local) from August 1929 to just 
before the bank holiday in March 1933. He also distinguished between temporary and 
permanent suspensions. Based on a questionnaire asked by bank examiners after each 
bank suspension, Richardson put together a complete list of the causes of each suspension. 
The categories include: depositor runs, declining asset prices, the failure of 
correspondents, mergers, mismanagement and defalcations. Richardson then classified 
each bank suspension into categories reflecting illiquidity, insolvency or both. With this 
data he then constructed indices of illiquidity and insolvency. His data shows that 60% of 
the suspensions during the period reflected insolvency, 40% illiquidity. Moreover he   10
shows that the ratio of illiquidity to insolvency spikes during the Friedman and Schwartz 
(and also Wicker) panic windows (see Figure 2.1). This evidence in some respects 
complements the Friedman and Schwartz, Wicker stories and those of Temin and White. 
During the panics illiquidity rises relative to insolvency; between the panics insolvency 
increases relative to illiquidity. Consistent with the Friedman and Schwartz stories, the 
panics were driven by illiquidity shocks seen in increased hoarding, but after the panics, 
in the face of deteriorating economic conditions, bank insolvencies continued to rise. This 
is consistent with the evidence of Temin and White. The failures continued through the 
contraction until the banking holiday of the week of March 6, 1933 (with the exception of 
the spring of 1932 while the Fed was temporarily engaged in open market purchases). 
 
Richardson (2006) backs up the illiquidity story with detailed evidence on the 1930 
banking panic. As in Wicker (1980) the failure of Caldwell and Co. in November was the 
signature event of this crisis. Richardson uses his new data base to identify the cascade of 
failures through the correspondent bank networks based on the Caldwell banks. During 
this period most small rural banks maintained deposits on reserve with larger city banks 
that in turn would clear their checks through big city clearinghouses and/or the Federal 
Reserve System. When Caldwell collapsed so did the correspondent network. Moreover 
Richardson and Troost (2009) clearly show that when the tidal wave from Caldwell hit 
the banks of the state of Mississippi in December that the banks in the southern half of 
the state under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta fared much better 
(had a lower failure rate) than those in the northern half under the jurisdiction of the   
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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The Atlanta Fed followed Bagehot’s Rule discounting 
freely the securities of illiquid but solvent member banks. The St. Louis Fed followed the 
real bills doctrine and was reluctant to open the discount window to its member banks in 
trouble. This pattern holds up when the authors control for fundamentals using a 
framework like that in Calomiris and Mason (2003).
2 
 
Finally, Christiano et al (2004) build a DSGE model of the Great Contraction 
incorporating monetary and financial shocks. They find that the key propagation channels 
explaining the slump were the decline in the deposit currency ratio, amplified by 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist’s (1996) financial accelerator. The liquidity shock 
reduced funding for firms, lowering investment and firm’s net worth. At the same time 
the increased currency hoarding reduced consumption expenditure. Their simulations, 
like those of McCallum (1990) and Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (1995) show that 
expansionary open market purchases could have offset these shocks. 
 
In sum, the debate over illiquidity versus insolvency in the failures of U.S. banks hinges 
on the use of aggregate versus disaggregated data. Aggregate data tends to favor 
illiquidity and the presence of and importance of banking panics in creating the Great 
Contraction. Disaggregate data tends to focus on insolvency driven by the recession and 
to downplay the role of the panics in creating the Great Contraction. However the recent 
more comprehensive data unearthed by Richardson as well as the Christiano et al model 
suggests that the original Friedman and Schwartz story may well prevail. 
                                                 
2  Carlson ( 2008) shows that during the panic banks that would otherwise have merged with stronger banks 
rather than fail were prevented from doing so.   13
3. Why Did the U.S. have so many banking panics? 
 
We have argued that the signature event in the U.S. Great Contraction was the series of 
banking panics from 1930-33. But this was nothing new in U.S. financial history. From 
the early nineteenth century until 1914, the U.S. had a banking panic every decade. There 
is a voluminous literature on U.S. financial stability and the lessons that come from that 
literature are that the high incidence of banking instability reflected two forces: unit 
banking and the absence of an effective lender of last resort. 
 
3.1 Unit Banking 
 
Fear of the concentration of economic power largely explains why states generally 
prohibited branch banking and why since the demise of the Second Bank of the United 
States in 1836 until quite recently there was no interstate banking (White 1983). Unit 
banks, because their portfolios were geographically constrained were highly subject to 
local idiosyncratic shocks. Branching banks, especially those which extended across 
regions can better diversify their portfolios and protect themselves against local/regional 
shocks. 
 
A comparison between the experience of the U.S. and Canadian banking systems makes 
the case (Bordo, Redish and Rockoff 1996). The U.S. until the 1920s has had 
predominantly unit banking and until very recently a prohibition on interstate banking. 
Canada since the late nineteenth century has had nationwide branch banking. Canada 
only adopted a central bank in 1934. The U.S. established the Fed in 1914. Canada had   14
no banking panics since Confederation in 1867, the U.S. had nine. However the Canadian 
chartered banks were always highly regulated and operated very much like a cartel under 
the guidance of the Canadian Bankers Association and the Department of Finance. 
 
3.2 A Lender of Last Resort 
 
Since the demise of the Second Bank of the United States until the establishment of the 
Federal Reserve in 1914, the U.S. has not had anything like a central bank to act as a 
lender of last resort as the Bank of England had evolved into during the nineteenth 
century (Bordo, 2007).  Clearinghouses, established first in New York City in 1857 and 
other major cities later, on occasion acted as a lender of last resort by pooling the 
resources of the members and issuing clearinghouse loan certificates as a substitute for 
scarce high powered money reserves. However on several prominent occasions before 
1914 the clearinghouses did not allay panics (Timberlake, 1992). Panics were often ended 
in the National Banking era by the suspension of convertibility of deposits into currency. 
Also the U.S. Treasury on a few occasions performed lender of last resort functions. 
 
The Federal Reserve was established to serve (amongst other functions) as a lender of last 
resort but as documented above, failed in its task between 1930 and 1933. Discount 
window lending to member banks was at the prerogative of the individual Federal 
Reserve banks and as discussed above, some Reserve banks did not follow through. 
Moreover until the establishment of the National Credit Corporation in 1931 (which 
became the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932) there was no monetary   15
authority to provide assistance to non member banks (Wicker, 1996). Wicker effectively 
argues that the panics pre 1914 always were centered in the New York money market and 
then spread via the vagaries of the National banking system to the regions. The New 
York Fed, according to him, learned the lesson of the panics of the national banking 
system and did prevent panics from breaking out in New York City during the Great 
Contraction. But as he argues, it did not develop the tools to deal with the regional 
banking panics which erupted in 1930 and 1931. 
 
3.3 Recent Evidence 
 
There is considerable empirical evidence going back to the nineteenth century on the case 
linking unit banking to failures and panics (White, 1983). Cross country regression 
evidence in Grossman (1994) and Grossman (2010) finds that during the 1930s countries 
which had unit banking had a greater incidence of banking instability than those which 
did not. For the U.S., Wheelock (1995) finds, based on state and county level data that 
states that allowed branching had lower bank failure rates than those which did not. 
However Carlson (2004) (also Calomiris and Mason, 2003) find based on a panel of  
individual banks that state branch banks in the U.S. were less likely to survive the 
banking panics. The reason Carlson gives is that while state branch banks can diversify 
against idiosyncratic local shocks better than can unit banks they were still exposed to the 
systemic shocks of the 1930s. He argues that branch banks used the diversification 
opportunities of branching to increase their returns but also followed more risky 
strategies such as holding lower reserves.   16
 
Carlson and Michener (2009) show, based on data on Californian banks in the 1930s 
(California was a state that allowed branch banking) that the entry of large branching 
networks, by improving the competitive environment actually improved the survival 
probabilities of unit banks. They explain the divergent results between studies based on 
individual banks and those based on state and county level data by the argument that the 
U.S. banking system would have been less fragile in the 1930s had states allowed more 
branching not because branch banks would have been more diversified but because the 
system would have had more efficient banks. 
4. Econometric Evidence 
 
In this section an orthogonalized vector autoregression (VAR) is estimated using 
aggregate data on bank failures/suspensions, unemployment, money supply and a quality 
spread which is the difference between the yield on a Baa rated bond and a composite 
yield on 10 year maturity Treasury bills. The data we use on bank failures/suspensions 
includes a series on total bank failures/suspensions found in Table 12 of the 1937 Federal 
Reserve Bulletin and two new series on bank failures/suspensions due to illiquidity and 
insolvency from Richardson (2007).  
 
The aim of this exercise is to identify illiquidity shocks from insolvency shocks in an 
attempt to answer the question of the underlying fundamental causes of the financial 
crises identified by Friedman and Schwartz (1963). The use of aggregate data is useful 
for this aim in that we are able to identify common trends (or factors) affecting the   17
aggregate economy. This approach is in contrast to the literature on explaining bank 
failures during the Great Depression that uses disaggregated micro data on banks at the 
local, state, and regional level. This literature is successful at explaining why different 
locations were affected in different ways during the financial crises but is silent on the 
underlying common factors (if any) that were driving the crises.  
 
Probably the best known paper from this literature, Calomiris and Mason (2003), utilize a 
panel data set of Federal Reserve banks and estimate a bank survival duration model for 
the period of great bank stress during the early 1930’s. This excellent paper claims, 
among other things, that the bank failures during this period were local and regional in 
nature and that their covariates, such as individual measures of bank stress, do a good job 
of explaining why banks failed during the first three financial crises identified by 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963). They show this by adding in crisis dummies for the three 
periods (Oct-1930 to Jan-1931, March-1931 to Aug-1931, and Sept-1931 to Dec-1931) 
into their log-logistic survival model and show that these event dummies add little to the 
predicted bank failures generated by their model. Because the log-logistic survival model 
has a time varying underlying hazard function what this study shows is that the event 
dummy does not explain more than the baseline hazard function underlying their 
econometric model.  
 
Using this methodology with disaggregated data is therefore silent on whether the local 
and regional bank failures that were observed were driven by underlying common factors   18
that were national in scope.
3 What this study does show however is that the regional/local 
differences in bank failures that are orthogonal to the underlying baseline hazard can be 
explained by bank fundamentals.  What we do not know is whether the underlying 
baseline hazard was also driven by bank fundamentals or by common aggregate (or 
national) factors. In general, we know of no disaggregated study that does allow for a 
factor structure in the covariates of the model so that the nature of the common factors 
affecting bank failures in the 1930s, if any, is still an open question. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to this debate using the new series on bank failures 
constructed by Richardson (2007). In this study, as mentioned above, Richardson uses 
reports from the Federal Reserve Board to assign bank failures to one of two categories: 
failure or suspension due to insolvency and failure or suspension (of otherwise solvent 
banks) due to illiquidity. Our hope is that we can identify, using an orthogonalized VAR, 
the underlying fundamental aggregate illiquidity and insolvency shocks and determine 
whether they have any explanatory power in explaining bank failures. We see this study 
as complimentary to the disaggregated studies noted above.  
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the data we have on total number of bank failures and suspensions 
(hereafter referred to as BFS, from Table 12 of the 1937 Federal Reserve Bulletin) and 
the two series sourced from Richardson (2007). The shaded regions in the figure show 
the Friedman and Schwartz  
                                                 
3 In their regression Calomiris and Mason (2003) do include national variables but find that they are not 
significant. However, this means that the national variables do not explain the differences in bank 
suspensions orthogonal to their baseline hazard which most likely contains the national factors impacting 
ON bank suspensions.    19
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(1963) financial crises windows. It is apparent from the figure that the illiquidity and 
insolvency series behave quite differently especially during the first crisis of 1931. 
Through the use of an orthogonalized VAR we aim to extract from these series a set of 
orthogonal illiquidity shocks and insolvency shocks with the hope of determining their 
relevance to explaining the underlying behavior of the total bank failure series. 
 
The data that we use from Richardson (2007) are his broad measures of bank 
failures/suspensions due to illiquidity and insolvency. Richardson (2007, p. 602—603)   20
describes in detail exactly which suspensions are determined to be due to illiquidity and 
which are due to insolvency. Banks included in the illiquidity series include those that 
were suspended temporarily, those that closed permanently because of heavy withdrawals 
and those that closed because of the failure of correspondent banks. Also included in the 
broad definition are banks that were suspended because their assets were considered to be 
slow or they failed to get loans from correspondent banks or they ran out of reserves. The 
broad definition of banks that were deemed to have failed or suspended because of 
insolvency included banks with slow, worthless, or frozen assets, depreciation of assets 
(real estate, stocks and bonds), inability to collect loans, and local depression.  
 
These two series do not sum up to total bank failures/suspensions. Reasons for this 
include double counting (some banks were counted multiple times if they were suspended 
temporarily, reopened and then subsequently closed) and the exclusion or two additional 
categories explaining bank failure/suspension. These two categories include poor 
management and defalcations (fraud or other reasons). 
 
4.2 VAR Analysis 
 
The six variables that we include in our model are the three time series on bank 
failures/suspensions, the quality spread (as a measure of Bernanke (1983)’s credit 
disintermediation channel), the change in the unemployment rate and the growth rate of 
money supply. In order to identify underlying structural shocks to the system we utilize a 
triangular ordering so that variables ordered earlier contemporaneously affect variables   21
ordered later while variables ordered later do not contemporaneously affect variables 
ordered before them. Thus the contemporaneous impact matrix for the endogenous 
variables is lower-triangular with 1’s on its diagonal. We also assume that the structural 
shocks are orthogonal to each other but have potentially different variances.  
 
The data are ordered in two blocks: The first block includes the bank failures/suspensions 
time series and the second include the money, unemployment, and quality spread 
variables. Thus bank failures will contemporaneously affect money supply, 
unemployment and the quality spread.   
 
The three bank failure variables in the system are bank failures/suspensions due to 
illiquidity, banks failures/suspensions due to insolvency and total bank 
failures/suspensions. The most important assumption is the ordering of the bank 
failures/suspensions due to illiquidity series before the bank failures/suspensions due to 
insolvency series in the VAR. In Richardson (2007) banks that fail or are suspended due 
to a reason of illiquidity are counted in the number of fails/suspensions due to liquidity 
and banks that fail or are suspended due to insolvency are assigned to the number of 
fails/suspensions due to insolvency. It is possible to imagine a situation where a bank run 
(an illiquidity shock) may cause banks that are otherwise solvent to fail due to illiquidity.  
Insolvent banks may also be caught up in the bank run and therefore it is natural to think 
that bank failures due to illiquidity will contemporaneously affect banks 
failures/suspensions due to insolvency.
4  
                                                 
4  These technically insolvent banks may still be operating due to asymmetric information between 
depositors and bank operators.    22
 
The failure of insolvent banks would not immediately affect illiquid but otherwise solvent 
banks, at least in the short run. However, the solvency shock may also cause, through 
contagion, a run on otherwise healthy banks, especially if there was a run up of closures 
of insolvent banks preceding the bank run.  Our identifying assumption is that if the 
insolvency shock causes a bank run then this will happen with a time lag. That is, the 
identifying assumption is that the illiquidity shock might cause some insolvent banks to 
fail contemporaneously whereas the insolvency shock will lead to failures due to 
illiquidity only with a lag. The final variable is total bank failures and is not exactly equal 
to the sum of the previous two bank failure series. This is because not all bank failures 
are attributed to illiquidity or insolvency as noted in the previous paragraph.  
 
The ordering we choose for the last three variables is the following: the first variable is 
the growth rate of the money supply, the second is the change in the unemployment rate 
and the third is the quality spread. The triangular ordering we use implies then that each 
variable contemporaneously effects each variable ordered below it but not any variable 
ordered above it in the vector. Thus a change in the growth rate of money supply 
contemporaneously affects the change in unemployment and the quality spread while the 
change in the unemployment rate contemporaneously affects the quality spread. These 
variables then affect bank failures/suspensions with a lag. 
 
Thus we identify six shocks in total that we interpret as follows: the first shock, is the 
illiquidity shock, the second is the insolvency shock while the third is a bank   23
failure/suspension residual shock. It is the shock to banks failures/suspensions that cannot 
be attributed to either illiquidity or insolvency. The next three shocks are a money growth 
rate shock, an aggregate real shock to unemployment that is orthogonal to the money 
growth shock, and a shock to the quality spread that is orthogonal to all the previous 
shocks. We might consider this shock to be a credit shock.  Note we cannot with this 
specification identify supply or demand shocks for both the money shocks and aggregate 
real shocks.  
 
The reduced form VAR is estimated using ordinary least squares with two lags of each 
variable in each equation. Before estimation each variable was tested for non-stationarity. 
The detailed results are reported in the appendix. It was determined that the money 
supply and unemployment series were non-stationary so that all variables enter the VAR 
in log-levels except for money supply and the unemployment rate who enter as first 
differences of the log-level.  The sample period used (based on Richardson’s data) 
finished in February, 1933 and so does not include the period of the bank holiday starting 
on March 6, 1933. 
 
The lag structure was determined using various information criteria and the standard 
sequential likelihood ratio tests. All information criteria and the sequential likelihood 
ratio test suggest two lags should be included. The results from this estimation are 
reported in Table A.2 of the appendix. These estimates are reported in Table A.3 in the 
appendix. The results from Table A.3 suggest that there are a large number of significant 
contemporaneous relationships between the variables. All coefficients are significant   24
except for the effect of the illiquidity and insolvency shocks on the growth rate of money 
supply.  In order to determine the effect of our identified shocks on the variables in our 
system we now turn to the orthogonalized impulse response functions. All of the impulse 
response functions are reported in the appendix.  
 
A full discussion of all the impulse response functions can be found in the appendix. In 
what follows we summarize our findings and highlight the important conclusions. Figure 
4.2 shows the impulse response functions for total bank failures/suspensions and Table 
4.1 reports the forecast error variance decomposition. It is clear that the illiquidity shock 
has a large and persistent effect on total bank failures/suspensions. The forecast error 
variance decompositions show that the illiquidity shock accounts for roughly 50% of the 
forecast error with the insolvency shock only accounting for 16%. Thus it appears that 
the illiquidity shock is very important for explaining total bank failures/suspensions.  
 
One additional point to make with regard to total bank failures/suspensions is that the 
money shock also has some effect. A positive shock to money growth has the effect of 
lowering bank failures/suspensions. This result is persistent and occurs for each of the 
bank failure/suspension series. The effect of money is especially strong and persistent for 
the bank failures/suspensions due to insolvency series. This result suggests that monetary 
policy aim at increasing the growth rate of money may have helped to mitigate some of 
the bank failures/suspensions that occurred during the early 1930’s. This result reinforces 
the views of Christiano et al (2004), McCallum (1990) and Bordo, Choudhri and 
Schwartz (1995).   25
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Table 4.1: Forecast Error Decomposition for Total Bank Failures/Suspensions 
 S.E.  Illiquidity  Insolvency Residual  Money 
Real 
Aggregate Spread 
1 0.51  75.11 13.02 11.87  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 0.66  62.02 15.09 16.91  1.88  0.12  3.98 
3 0.71  55.86 15.72 14.66  7.73  0.22  5.81 
4 0.73  52.51 16.24 13.75 11.29  0.49  5.73 
5 0.75  51.17 16.59 13.54 11.96  1.30  5.45 
6 0.77  50.57 16.51 12.98 12.43  2.26  5.25 
7 0.77  50.86 16.35 12.82 12.40  2.23  5.33 
8 0.78  50.82 16.34 12.68 12.53  2.21  5.42 
9 0.78  50.66 16.56 12.59 12.51  2.20  5.48 
10  0.78  50.48 16.68 12.49 12.64  2.22  5.50 
 
The effect of the real aggregate shock on total bank failures/suspension series is 
somewhat significant at about the sixth lag and this result is somewhat stronger for the 
bank failure/suspension due to illiquidity and insolvency series. 
 
Our identification assumptions were that the bank failures/suspensions led to immediate 
shocks on money, unemployment and the quality spread. The impulse responses for these 
three variables do not contradict this identification assumption. In fact we observe that 
the illiquidity and insolvency shock do indeed have immediate and significant effects on 
unemployment (a positive illiquidity or insolvency shock induces a rise in 
unemployment) and we observe that the illiquidity shock has a significant negative and 
persistent effect on money growth.  
 
The impulse responses therefore generally produce results that accord with the idea that 
the bank failures/suspensions fed directly into unemployment and money supply and 
these in turn fed back into the bank failure/suspension series. In fact we see that the   27
illiquidity shock has a significant and negative shock on money and money in turn has a 
significant, large and persistent effect on bank failures/suspensions due to insolvency. 
Thus the illiquidity shock has a strong direct and indirect effect on bank failures due to 
insolvency. 
 
The impulse response functions together with the variance decompositions show that the 
illiquidity shock is very important in explaining the bank failures/suspensions during the 
early 1930’s. In order to determine if the illiquidity shocks played a role during the 
particular financial crisis windows identified by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) we now 
turn to historical decompositions. Figure 4.3 contains historical decompositions for the 
total bank failures/suspensions series. Each panel of Figure 4.3 contains a simulated total 
bank failures/suspensions series under the hypothesis that only one orthogonalized shock 
was driving the stochastic component of the data. Thus the paned titled illiquidity shock 
shows the generated series if there was only an illiquidity shock.  
 
The results of the historical decompositions clearly point to the illiquidity shock playing a 
significant role in the bank failures during the Friedman and Schwartz crisis windows. 
The most obvious case is during the first window from October, 1930 to January, 1931. 
Here the historical decomposition for the illiquidity series almost completely follows the 
actual data. The other shocks do not explain this first crisis window at all. For the next 
two crisis windows that take up most of 1931 the illiquidity shock does generate series 
that follow the actual series quite well. During these periods the money shock and the  
   28
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insolvency shock generate series that do peak around the right time but they do not 
generate series that closely follow the actual total bank failures/suspensions series. The   29
only crisis window that the insolvency shock does predict well appears to the final crisis 
of early 1933. In this case it does appear that the financial crisis in 1933 is more an 
insolvency story then an illiquidity story.  
 
To summarize we have estimate a VAR and used a triangular ordering to identify a set of 
shocks including illiquidity and insolvency shocks. The impulse response functions 
obtained from this orthogonalized VAR make sense and show that the illiquidity shock is 
an important shock for explaining the observed bank failures/suspensions series. Further, 
the historical decompositions show that the financial crises of late 1930 and all of 1931 
are well modeled as illiquidity crises. The financial crisis of 1933 is better explained as 
an insolvency crisis.  
 
Finally, we should caution that the results obtained above are obtained from an 
orthogonalized VAR and so do not have a full structural interpretation. For example we 
have not included wages or prices and we have not identified money supply and money 
demand shocks separately from each other, nor have we identified aggregate demand and 
supply shocks separately from each other. We have only identified shocks to money 
supply and to unemployment but cannot say whether these are due to demand or supply 
shocks.  
 
While we want to be cautious in interpreting our results we have also performed a 
number of robustness checks. First, the result that the illiquidity shock is the dominant 
shock for explaining the total bank failures/suspensions is robust to how the real and   30
monetary variables are ordered. For example, putting the money growth rate, change in 
unemployment, and quality spread block first does not change the results on the relative 
importance of the illiquidity shock on total bank failures/suspensions presented above.  
 
A second robustness check was to drop the quality spread from the VAR and only 
include money growth and unemployment in the VAR. Again the illiquidity shock is the 
dominant shock on total bank failures/suspensions. Third, we also follow the Bernanke 
(1983) story and replace the money variable with the quality spread variable. Again we 
get qualitatively similar results in that the illiquidity shock is dominant in explaining the 
total bank failures/suspensions series. The quality spread appears to be more important 
between the third and fourth financial crises (i.e. during 1932) but does not play an 
important role during the four financial crises windows.    
 
5. A Comparison of the Financial Crisis in the U.S. to the 2007-2008 Crisis 
 
Many people have invoked the experience during the Great Contraction and especially 
the banking crises of 1929-33 as a good comparison to the financial crisis and Great 
Recession of 2007-2009. In several descriptive figures in this section we compare the 
behavior of some key variables between the two events. We demarcate the crisis 
windows in the Great Contraction using Friedman and Schwartz’s dates. For the recent 
period we use Gorton’s (2010) characterization of the crisis as starting in the shadow 
bank repo market in August 2007 (dark grey shading)and then changing to a panic in the 
Universal banks after Lehman failed in September 2007 (light grey shading) . In most   31
respects, e.g. the magnitude of the decline in real GDP and the rise in unemployment (see 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2) the two events are very different but there are some parallels in 
recent events to the 1930s. In Figure 5.1 we report real GNP for the 1930’s and the 
2007—2009 normalized to be 100 at the start of each period. It is quite clear that the 
contraction in late 2007 was mild (only about 5% peak to trough) relative to Great 
Contraction in the 1930’s (roughly 35% peak to trough). The same is clear for 
unemployment which is depicted in Figure 5.2. Unemployment rose from near 0% at the 
start of the Great Contraction to slightly over 25% by the end of the contraction whereas 
the rise in unemployment from 4% to 10% for the most recent contraction is small in 
comparison.  
 
As discussed above the signature of the Great Contraction was a collapse in the money 
supply brought about by a collapse in the public’s deposit currency ratio, a decline in the 
banks deposit reserve ratio and a drop in the money multiplier (see Figures 5.3-5.6). In 
the recent crisis M2 did not collapse, indeed it rose reflecting expansionary monetary 
policy. Moreover the deposit currency ratio did not collapse in the recent crisis, it rose. 
There were no runs on the commercial banks because depositors knew that their deposits 
were protected by federal deposit insurance which was introduced in 1934 in reaction to 
the bank runs of the 1930s. The deposit reserve ratio declined reflecting an expansionary 
monetary policy induced increase in banks excess reserves rather than a scramble for 
liquidity as in the 1930s. The money multiplier declined in the recent crisis largely 
explained by a massive expansion in the monetary base reflecting the Fed’s doubling of    32
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its balance sheet in 2008 (see Figure 5.7). Moreover although a few banks failed recently, 
they were miniscule relative to the 1930s (Figure 5.8) as were deposits in failed banks 
relative to total deposits (see Figure 5.9).
5 
 
Thus the recent financial crisis and recession was not a pure Friedman and Schwartz 
money story. It was not driven by an old fashioned contagious banking panic. But like 
1930-33 there was a financial crisis. It reflected a run in August 2007 on the Shadow 
Banking system which was not regulated by the central bank nor covered by the financial 
safety net. According to Eichengreen (2008) its rapid growth was a consequence of the 
repeal in 1999 of the Depression era Glass Steagall Act of 1935 which had separated 
commercial from investment banking. These institutions held much lower capital ratios 
than the traditional commercial banks and hence were considerably more prone to risk. 
When the crisis hit they were forced to engage in major deleveraging involving a fire sale 
of assets into a falling market which in turn lowered the value of their assets and those of 
other financial institutions. A similar negative feedback loop occurred during the Great 
Contraction according to Friedman and Schwartz. 
 
According to Gorton (2010) the crisis centered in the repo market (sale and repurchase
agreements) which had been collateralized by opaque (subprime) mortgage backed
   securities by which investment banks and some universal banks had been funded. The 
                                                 
           5 The large spike in 1933 in both figures 5.7 and 5.8 largely represents the Bank holiday of March 6-10 in 
       which the entire nation’s banks were closed and an army of examiners determined whether they were 
       solvent or not. At the end of the week one sixth of the nation’s banks were closed. The relatively large 
       spike in 2008 in the deposits in failed bank series reflected the failure and reorganization by the FDIC of 
       Countrywide bank. Compared to the case in the 1930s failures there were no insured depositor losses.   35
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repo crisis continued through 2008 and then morphed into an investment/universal bank 
crisis after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The crisis led to a credit 
crunch which led to a serious, but compared to the Great Contraction, not that serious 
recession (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). The recession was attenuated in 2009 by expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
Figure 5.10 compares the Baa- Ten year Composite Treasury spread between the two 
historical episodes. This spread is often used as a measure of credit market turmoil 
(Bordo and Haubrich 2010). As can be seen the spike in the spread in 2008 is not very 
different from that observed in the early 1930s. 
 
5.1 The Recent Crisis in more detail. 
 
The crisis occurred following two years of rising policy rates. Its causes include: major 
changes in regulation, lax regulatory oversight, a relaxation of normal standards of 
prudent lending and a period of abnormally low interest rates. The default on a significant 
fraction of subprime mortgages produced spillover effects around the world via the 
securitized mortgage derivatives into which these mortgages were bundled, to the balance 
sheets of investment banks, hedge funds and conduits( which are bank owned but off 
their balance sheets) which intermediate between mortgage and other asset backed   
commercial paper and long-term securities. The uncertainty about the value of the 
securities collateralized by these mortgages spread uncertainty through the financial 
system about the soundness of loans for leveraged buyouts. All of this led to the freezing    43
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of the interbank lending market in August 2007 and substantial liquidity injections by the 
Fed and other central banks. 
 
The Fed then both extended and expanded its discount window facilities and cut the 
federal funds rate by 300 basis points. The crisis worsened in March 2008 with the rescue 
of the Investment bank, Bear Stearns, by JP Morgan backstopped by funds from the 
Federal Reserve. The rescue was justified on the grounds that Bear Stearns exposure to 
counterparties was so extensive that a worse crisis would follow if it were not bailed out. 
The March crisis also led to the creation of a number of new discount window facilities 
whereby investment banks could access the window and which broadened the collateral 
acceptable for discounting. The next major event was a Federal Reserve Treasury bailout 
and partial nationalization of the insolvent GSEs, Fannie and Freddie Mac in July 2008 
on the grounds that they were crucial to the functioning of the mortgage market. 
 
Events took a turn for the worse in September 2008 when the Treasury and Fed allowed 
the investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail to discourage the belief that all insolvent 
institutions would be saved in an attempt to prevent moral hazard. It was argued that 
Lehman was both in worse shape and less exposed to counterparty risk than Bear Stearns. 
The next day the authorities bailed out and nationalized the insurance giant AIG fearing 
the systemic consequences for collateralized default swaps (insurance contracts on 
securities) if it were allowed to fail. The fallout from the Lehman bankruptcy then turned 
the liquidity crisis into a full fledged global credit crunch and stock market crash as 
interbank lending effectively seized up on the fear that no banks were safe.   45
  
In the ensuing atmosphere of panic, along with Fed liquidity assistance to the commercial 
paper market and the extension of the safety net to money market mutual funds, the US 
Treasury sponsored its Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) whereby $ 700 billion could 
be devoted to the purchase of heavily discounted mortgage backed and other securities to 
remove them from the banks’ balance sheets and restore bank lending. As it later turned 
out most of the funds were used to recapitalize the banks. 
 
In early October the crisis spread to Europe and to the emerging market countries as the 
global interbank market ceased functioning. The UK authorities responded by pumping 
equity into British banks, guaranteeing all interbank deposits and providing massive 
liquidity. The EU countries responded in kind. And on October 13 2008 the US Treasury 
followed suit with a plan to inject $250 into the U.S. banks, to provide insurance of 
senior interbank debt and unlimited deposit insurance for non interest bearing deposits. 
These actions ended the crisis. Expansionary Federal Reserve policy at the end of 2008, 
lowering the funds rate close to zero, followed by a policy of quantitative easing: the 
open market purchases of long-term Treasuries and mortgage backed securities finally 
attenuated the recession by the summer of 2009. 
 
Unlike the liquidity panics of the Great Contraction the deepest problem facing the 
financial system was insolvency. This was only recognized by the Fed after the 
September 2008 crisis. The problem stemmed from the difficulty of pricing securities 
backed by a pool of assets, whether mortgage loans, student loans, commercial paper   46
issues, or credit card receivables. Pricing securities based on a pool of assets is difficult 
because the quality of individual components of the pool varies and unless each 
component is individually examined and evaluated, no accurate price of the security can 
be determined.  
 
As a result, the credit market, confronted by financial firms whose portfolios were filled 
with securities of uncertain value, derivatives that were so complex the art of pricing 
them had not been mastered, was plagued by the inability to determine which firms were 
solvent and which were not. Lenders were unwilling to extend loans when they couldn’t 
be sure that a borrower was creditworthy. This was a serious shortcoming of the 
securitization process that was responsible for the paralysis of the credit market. 
  
Finally another hallmark of the recent crisis which was not present in the Great 
Contraction is that the Fed and other US monetary authorities engaged in a series of 
bailouts of incipient and actual insolvent firms deemed too systemically connected to fail. 
These included Bear Stearns in March 2008, the GSEs in July and AIG in September. 
Lehman Brothers had been allowed to fail in September on the grounds that it was both 
insolvent and not as systemically important as the others and as was stated well after the 
event that the Fed didn’t have the legal authority to bail it out. The extension of the “Too 
Big To Fail” doctrine which had begun in 1984 with the bailout of Continental Illinois 
bank may be the source of future crises.   47
 
6. Conclusion: Some policy lessons from history.  
 
In this paper we have reexamined the issue of the role of the banking panics between 
1930 and 1933 in creating the Great Contraction. We focused on the debate between 
those following the Friedman and Schwartz view that the banking crises were illiquidity 
shocks and those following the Temin approach who view the clusters  of banking 
failures as  not being liquidity driven panics but insolvencies caused by the recession. 
Our survey of the evidence suggests that the banking crises did reflect contagious 
illiquidity. But also that endogenous insolvency was important between the panics. Bank 
failures regardless of their genesis contributed to the depression by reducing the money 
supply and by crippling the credit mechanism. 
 
Our empirical results showed that illiquidity played a major role in the financial crises of 
late 1930 and all 1931. We estimated a VAR and used a triangular ordering to identify a 
set of shocks including illiquidity and insolvency shocks. The impulse response functions 
obtained from this orthogonalized VAR make sense and show that the illiquidity shock is 
an important shock for explaining the observed bank failures/suspensions series. Further, 
the historical decompositions show that the financial crisis of late 1930 and all of 1931 
are well modeled as illiquidity crises. The financial crisis of 1933 is better explained as 
an insolvency crisis.  
 
The Federal Reserve learned the Friedman and Schwartz lesson from the banking panics 
of the 1930s of the importance of conducting expansionary open market policy to meet   48
all of the demands for liquidity (Bernanke 2002). In the recent crisis the Fed conducted 
highly expansionary monetary policy in the fall of 2007 and from late 2008 to the present. 
Also , based on Bernanke’s 1983 view that the banking collapse led to a failure of the 
credit allocation mechanism, the Fed, in conjunction with the Treasury, developed a 
plethora of extensions to its discount window referred to as credit policy (Goodfriend, 
2009) to encompass virtually every kind of collateral in an attempt to unclog the blocked 
credit markets. 
 
Some argue that for the first three quarters of 2008 that Fed monetary policy was actually 
too tight seen in a flattening of money growth and the monetary base and high real 
interest rates (Hetzel, 2009). Although the Fed’s balance sheet surged, the effects on high 
powered money were sterilized. This may have reflected concern that rising commodity 
prices at the time would spark inflationary expectations. By the end of the third quarter of 
2008 the sterilization ceased evident in a doubling of the base. 
 
The Fed’s credit policy involved providing credit directly to markets and firms the Fed 
deemed most in need of liquidity and exposed the Fed to the temptation to politicize its 
selection of the recipients of its credit (Schwartz 2009). In addition the Fed’s balance 
sheet ballooned in 2008 and 2009 with the collateral of risky assets including those of 
non banks. These assets were in part backed by the Treasury. The Fed also worked 
closely with the Treasury in the fall of 2008 to stabilize the major banks with capital 
purchases and stress testing. Moreover the purchase of mortgage backed securities in 
2009 (quantitative easing) combined monetary with fiscal policy. These actions which   49
many argue helped reduce the spreads and reopen the credit channels impinged upon the 
Fed’s independence and created problems for the Fed in the future (Bordo, 2010). 
 
As discussed in section 5, the deepest problem of the recent crisis however was not 
illiquidity as it was in the 1930s but insolvency and especially the fear of insolvency of 
counterparties. This has echoes in the correspondence banking induced panic of 
November 1930 (Richardson, 2006). But very different from the 1930s the too big to fail 
doctrine which had developed in the 1980s ensured that the monetary authorities would 
bail out insolvent large financial firms which were deemed too interconnected to fail. 
This is a dramatic departure from the original Bagehot’s rule prescription to provide 
liquidity to illiquid but solvent banks. This new type of systemic risk (Tallman and 
Wicker 2010) raises the spectre of moral hazard and future financial crises and future 
bailouts. 
 
In conclusion the crisis of 2007-2008 had similarities to the 1930s in that there was a 
panic in the shadow banking system and the repo market in 2007 as argued by Gorton 
( 2010) but also in investment banks and the universal banking system after Lehman 
failed in September 2008. But it was not a classic contagious banking panic. The decision 
to bail out large interconnected financial institutions in the fall of 2008 does not have 
much resonance in the 1930s experience. The closest parallel from the 1930s was the 
Bank of United States which failed in December 1930. It was one of the largest banks in 
the country but it was insolvent and it was allowed to fail (Lucia 1985). A key concern   50
from the bailouts of 2008 is that in the future the too big to fail doctrine will lead to 
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Appendix 
 




Before constructing and estimating a VAR we first need to investigate the time series 
properties of the time series used in the VAR. The results of various unit root tests are 
reported in Table A.1. Even though the period we investigate in the VAR is only 51 
months long, we test for a unit root in each series using all the data we have on each 
series. In some cases this is for most of the Twentieth Century but for others, in particular 
the bank fail series, we only have 51 observations. Given that the standard unit-root tests 
have poor power in small samples we utilize three different tests to determine the 
underlying unit root properties of the individual time series.  
 
We utilize the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test of Dickey and 
Fuller (1979), the Heteroskedastic corrected augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF-GLS) test of 
Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) (both of these tests have the hypothesis that the time 
series has a unit root as its null hypothesis), and the unit root test of Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS, 1992). This last test has as its null hypothesis that the 
time series being tested is stationary.  
 
The results for the three bank failure series all suggest that the logarithm of bank failures 
do not contain a unit root. Both of the ADF based tests reject the null hypothesis that the   58
individual series contain a unit root. However, the KPSS is also rejected contradicting the 
ADF tests. In order to determine if these series have a unit root or not the cointegration 
test of Johansen (1991) is used on the three variables. This test finds three cointegrating 
relationships which implies that the three series are indeed stationary (or I(0)). Given this 
preponderance of evidence we include the log-level of the bank failure series in our VAR 
system.  
 
The unit tests on the quality spread variable are quite clear in rejecting the hypothesis that 
it contains a unit root, in the case of the ADF tests, and not rejecting the hypothesis that it 
is stationary, in the case of the KPSS test, so we conclude that the quality spread is 
stationary and so we will include the log-level of the quality spread in our VAR. The 
final two aggregate series, the logarithm of the money supply and the logarithm of the 
unemployment rate are found to be non-stationary. Thus these variables will enter into 
the VAR as first differences. Thus we will be using the growth rate of money supply and 
the percentage change of the unemployment rate as our variables reflecting the real and 
monetary side of the economy (along with the quality spread).  
 
A.2 Discussion of Impulse Response Functions 
 
The effect of the six shocks on bank failures due to illiquidity can be seen in Figure A.1. 
A one standard deviation illiquidity shock appears to quite persistent given that the 
impulse response of bank failures/suspensions due to illiquidity does not return to 0 (in a 
statistical sense) until 4 months after the shock A insolvency shock has a significant   59
effect on bank failures/suspensions due to illiquidity but the effect is small and peaks 
after one month. The same can be said for the residual bank fail shock. We see from the 
third panel of Figure A.1 that a positive shock to bank failures/suspensions leads to an 
increase in fail due to illiquidity in the future with the peak effect occurring only one 
month out.  
 
The effects of the real shocks are also consistent with prior beliefs. An increase in the 
growth rate of money leads to a decrease in bank failures/suspensions due to illiquidity 
but the effect is not immediate with the significant negative impact occurring 4 months 
after the money shock. The effect of a one standard deviation increase in the 
unemployment rate (a negative real aggregate shock) also adversely effects bank 
failures/suspensions due to illiquidity but there is a long delay of 6 months before there is 
a significant increase in bank fails/suspensions due to illiquidity.  Finally an increase in 
the quality spread (another negative shock to the economy) leads to an increase in bank 
fails/suspensions due to illiquidity but the significance of this impact is questionable and 
again the impact appears to be short lived.  
 
Figure A.2 reports the impulse responses of bank fails/suspensions due to the six 
structural shocks. Similar patterns appear here as well. There are however some 
important differences to the impulse to bank fails/suspensions due to illiquidity. First, the 
illiquidity shock has just as big an impact as the insolvency shock.  
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The illiquidity shock is quite persistent as well with a positive effect on bank 
failures/suspensions due to insolvency lasting 2 months. Another interesting result is the 
effect the money growth rate shock has on bank failures/suspensions due to insolvency. 
Again we see a positive shock to money growth rates have a negative effect on bank 
failures/suspensions due to insolvency. Unlike the bank failures/suspensions due to 
illiquidity series this effect happens sooner and is more persistent; lasting at least until 4 
months after the shock.  Unlike the bank failures/suspensions due to illiquidity series the 
unemployment shock and the quality spread shock do not significantly affect bank 
failures/suspensions due to insolvency.  Figure A.3 shows the effect of the six shocks on 
total bank failures/suspensions. The results are similar with the illiquidity shock having a 
large and persistent effect on bank failures/suspensions and a positive money shock 
having a significant and persistent negative effect on total bank failures.  
 
The effects on the other three variables of the six structural shocks are shown in Figures 
A.4 – A.6. The growth rate of money is affected negatively by the illiquidity and residual 
bank failure shocks but not by the insolvency shock. The illiquidity shock is quite 
persistent while the residual shock is not. An unemployment shock does decrease money 
supply but only after 3 months while the quality spread shock also affects money growth 
negatively (note that the 95% confidence interval does include 0 on the boundary so we 
could say that it was significant at the 10% level at least). The quality spread shock is 
also quite persistent.  
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With regards to unemployment, the illiquidity and insolvency shocks have immediate and 
positive effects on unemployment but these effects are not persistent. The insolvency 
shock appears to lower unemployment after 3 months which is a puzzle but that may be 
due to the effect the unemployment (or real aggregate) shock has on itself where we see 
overshooting as unemployment declines 3 months after a positive real aggregate shock. 
The quality spread shock doe not appear to affect unemployment.  
 
Finally there is the effect of the six shocks on the quality spread. The money shock has a 
big effect on the quality spread with a positive shock the growth rate of money causing 
the quality spread to decline. The three bank fail series do not appear to significantly 
affect quality spread except that the illiquidity shock does appear to have a significant 
positive effect of the quality spread only in the period of the shock. The real aggregate 
shock has a significant but negative effect on the quality spread. Given that this shock is 
an increase in unemployment this negative effect on the quality spread is perverse and 
puzzling.   
 
Overall the impulse response functions are consistent with our prior beliefs – except for 
the one case of the effect of an unemployment shock on the quality spread. The results 
are consistent in that the illiquidity shock has a big and persistent impact on bank 
failures/suspensions while the insolvency shock, while significant, is not as persistent. 
The other consistent result was that a money shock had a negative impact on bank 
failures/suspensions with the biggest effect for the bank failures/suspensions due to 
insolvency.    62
 
Of course the impulse response functions do not give an indication of which shock is 
more important due to the fact that each impulse response is for a one standard deviation 
shock to the identified structural shocks and that each shock has a different variance. The 
estimated variances are reported in Table A.3 and it is clear that the illiquidity shock 
variance is large relative to the insolvency shock. In order to better compare the effect of 
each shock on the variables in our VAR we turn to the forecast error decomposition 
reported in Figure A.7. There we report the proportion of the forecast error for k periods 
into the future that can be attributed to each shock. The blue line in the figure is the 
contribution of the illiquidity shock, the red line the contribution of the insolvency shock 
and the black line the contribution of the money shock.  
 
The first thing to notice is that the illiquidity shock contributes the most for the bank 
failures/suspensions due to illiquidity and total bank failures/suspensions series and is 
also relatively equal to the contribution of the insolvency shock for the bank 
failures/suspensions due to insolvency series. The illiquidity shock also contributes 
nearly 20% of the forecast error variance for the money growth rate variable. The 
insolvency shock contributes significantly to unemployment but for all other variables it 
is not as important as the illiquidity shock. The money shock has an important 
contribution to bank failures/suspensions due to insolvency and to the quality spread but 
has relatively insignificant effects on the other variables.  
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Figure A.8 depicts the identified structural shocks. The shaded regions are the Friedman 
and Schwarz (1963) financial crises windows. For the first crises the illiquidity shock is 
prominent with its peak occurring at the start of the crisis window. The residual bank fail 
shock is also large early on in the crisis.  The peak in the insolvency occurs later in the 
crisis suggesting for that crisis the insolvency shock followed after the illiquidity shock.  
 
For the second crisis there is a large insolvency shock at the start of the window but a 
very large illiquidity shock about half way through the shock window. The insolvency 
shock again picks up at the end of the second crisis window but that may have been 
caused by the large negative shock to money supply growth that occurred at the time of 
the illiquidity shock.  
 
The third crisis has an appearance of a perfect storm in that there is a large negative 
money shock, a large positive unemployment shock, and a large positive shock to the 
quality spread immediately preceding the crisis window. There are also large positive 
illiquidity and insolvency shocks occurring as well. Finally the final crisis appears to be 
an insolvency and money story with a very large negative money shock immediately after 
a large insolvency shock in late 1932.  
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A.3 Tables and Figures 
 























c  0.32 
Trend No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Notes: 
1. The ADF and ADF-GLS tests both assume that the time series is I(1) as its null hypothesis while the 
KPSS test assumes the time series is I(0) as the null hypothesis. 
2. (a) significant at 10% level,  (b) significant at 5% level,  (c) significant at 1% level 
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Table A. 2: OLS Estimates of VAR in log-levels 
 
 
 Log(  BFS_Liq)  Log(BFS_Ins)Log(BFS_Tot) Δlog(M2)  Δlog(U) Spread 
Δlog(M2)  (-1) 5.81  -7.54 0.26 -0.36  -2.97  -3.15 
  (7.94)  (7.29)  (6.58)  (0.16) (7.62) (7.87) 
           
Δlog(M2) (-2)  4.39  -10.82  -7.40  0.16  -4.02  -5.49 
  (8.24)  (7.56)  (6.83)  (0.16) (7.90) (8.17) 
           
Δlog(U)  (-1)  0.24  0.39  0.20  0.00 0.03 0.40 
  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.00) (0.20) (0.21) 
           
Δlog(U) (-2)  -0.09  0.04  0.02  -0.01  -0.33  0.04 
  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.00) (0.14) (0.15) 
           
Spread (-1)  0.32  0.19  0.27  -0.01  0.04  1.18 
  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.00) (0.18) (0.19) 
           
Spread (-2)  -0.26  -0.15  -0.25  0.00  -0.03  -0.32 
  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.00) (0.17) (0.18) 
           
Log (BFS_Liq) (-1)  -0.78  -0.59  -0.40  -0.00 -0.29 -0.11 
  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.01) (0.27) (0.28) 
           
Log (BFS_Liq) (-2)  0.06  0.21  0.03  -0.01  0.53  -0.16 
  (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.01) (0.26) (0.27) 
           
Log (BFS_Ins) (-1)  -0.47  -0.11  -0.25  0.01  -0.79  -0.49 
  (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.32)  (0.01) (0.37) (0.39) 
           
Log (BFS_Liq) (-2)  0.68  0.83  0.57  -0.00  0.49  0.94 
  (0.38)  (0.35)  (0.31)  (0.01) (0.36) (0.37) 
           
Log (BFS_Tot)(-1)  2.13  1.16  1.21  -0.01  0.84  0.00 
  (0.52)  (0.47)  (0.43)  (0.01) (0.49) (0.51) 
           
Log (BFS_Tot)(-2)  -0.37  -0.85  -0.52  0.01  -1.00  -0.20 
  (0.56)  (0.51)  (0.46)  (0.01) (0.54) (0.56) 
           
Constant  -3.03  0.75  1.35  0.02 1.08 0.64 
  (1.60)  (1.47)  (1.33)  (0.03) (1.54) (1.59) 
R-squared  0.67  0.66  0.60  0.62 0.48 0.88 
Adj.  R-squared 0.54  0.53  0.44  0.47 0.28 0.84 
F-statistic 5.27  4.99  3.80  4.17  2.40  19.15 
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Table A.3: Estimates of Structural Parameters A and B 
 
Parameter Coefficient  Std.  Error  z-Statistic  Prob. 
21 a   -0.614695   0.102748 -5.982557    0.0000 
31 a   -0.448572   0.057968 -7.738234    0.0000 
32 a   -0.002437   0.005377 -0.453243    0.6504 
41 a   -0.247234   0.233739 -1.057736    0.2902 
42 a   -0.242731   0.249451 -0.973063    0.3305 
43 a   -0.438881   0.063160 -6.948743    0.0000 
51 a   -0.014055   0.005522 -2.545100    0.0109 
52 a   -1.059680   0.256503 -4.131264    0.0000 
53 a   -0.844729   0.318472 -2.652447    0.0080 
54 a    0.024928   0.009102   2.738911   0.0062 
61 a    0.957628   0.427019   2.242589   0.0249 
62 a    0.768833   0.475061   1.618388   0.1056 
63 a    15.61216   6.537610   2.388053   0.0169 
64 a    29.49544   7.322912   4.027829   0.0001 
65 a    0.541020   0.158882   3.405172   0.0007 
ill     0.614913   0.065550   9.380832   0.0000 
ins     0.419095   0.044676   9.380832   0.0000 
bf     0.175582   0.018717   9.380832   0.0000 
m     0.010600   0.001130   9.380832   0.0000 
u     0.459694   0.049004   9.380832   0.0000 
qs     0.484473   0.051645   9.380832   0.0000 
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